Description of the Battle of Davis Crossroads
and its significance (from AboutNorthGeorgia.com):
General Thomas's Union troops, of Sherman's grand army, had secretly moved through gaps in Lookout Mountain, en route to Atlanta, pushing through the plateau/mountaintop to reach McClemore Cove late in the day, September 9, 1863 (Negrey's troops ~ 14th Corps vanguard). Now they no longer enjoyed the cover of the mountains. They were spotted near Stevens Gap by men of General William Martin's Cavalry Division (3rd Alabama Regiment, Confederate). They had "stumbled upon the center wing of William S. Rosecrans' Union Army of the Cumberland" (AboutNorthGeorgia.com/ang/Battle_of_Davis_Crossroads). "Martin wired Bragg [at hdqrs., Lafayette], reporting an initial troop strength of 4,000 to 8,000 men...vulnerable to defeat..." (Martin then withdrew to Pigeon Mountain). "Martin's men began to reinforce the front of Pat Cleburne's division with trees and rocks, intended to prevent a Union force from passing over the mountain.""Bragg wanted to keep Rosecrans west of Chickamauga Creek to protect the Western and Atlantic Railroad and his storage depot in Ringgold, Georgia and use the wide creek as a defensive barrier between the two armies." [Through gaps in intelligence, illness of an officer, etcetera, Confederate support troops weren't in place for Bragg's officer, Thomas Hindman, in the planned attack. "The only problem with Bragg's plan was that Cleburne was firmly ensconced on Pigeon Mountain with a good deal of debris in front of him. Cleburne was also bedridden with a stomach ailment." [Superiors did not yet know that Cleburne was sick.]
[Negrey was still unaware that rebels were in the area and "crossed Chickamauga Creek, boldly moving across McLemore Cove at the head of his column in Marching formation and without skirmishers deployed." Negrey's troops were fired upon, Negrey's first realization that the enemy were around. "with haste he reformed into battle formation, sent out skirmishers, and continued forward movement to Davis Crossroads, where he determined to prepare his defenses for an attack in the face of increasing Rebel resistance. George Thomas rode in, spoke with Negrey and agreed with his decision to stop forward movement."]
When Bragg realized his advantage ~ that he had Union troops at a disadvantage, and that he could possible destroy a large portion of Thomas's troops and divide Sherman's army by destroying its center ~ he quickly changed tactics and planned a major attack.
However, his officers were confused as to exactly where and how many Union troops there were. When "Union artillery began responding to the Confederate fire from the far side of Chickamauga Creek, hurling shells into the Rebel line," Hindman feared the fire to be "from the main body of Thomas's force." That, "plus the waning daylight, forced Hindman to call off the attack." So ended the day of September 11, 1863. Bragg reprimanded Hindman.
"It was the Battle of Davis Crossroads that warned Rosecrans that the Confederates were 'in force' east of Lookout Mountain. Because of Bragg's willingness to attack, Rosecrans altered his plans to advance into Georgia's Ridge and Valley, perhaps even taking Rome. Instead, he would march...toward the relative safety of Chattanooga."
"For Bragg, it meant a series of communication errors resulted in a lost opportunity."
[If Bragg had had his way, he would have slaughtered a large portion of Sherman's grand army, destroying its center and dividing the army, the other two wings of which had separated to cross east (Chattanooga) and west (Alabama) of center.]
SOURCE: http://www.aboutnorthgeorgia.com/ang/Battle_of_Davis_Crossroads
(Plus my knowledge from other readings).
